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ABSTRACT
The complexity of the urban environment has repeatedly evaded descrip-
tions that attempt to encompass the range of that complexity. Transforma-
tions in that environment are themselves complex, and richly connected
with myriad other events and influences all exerting various force, this
way or that, towArd continuing outcomes. It is to the understanding of a
part of the richness of this process that this thesis is directed.
This is a case study of major and dramatic change in the structure of
a city, and the forces which were incident upon the realization of that
change. In considering the transformation which occurred in Montreal c.
1960, the thesis examines the parts played by major actors, their motives,
and their relative influence on the process of change. The context
against which these actors play their parts is delineated, and its
effects examined. The thesis concludes that the part played by the unusual
brilliance of one developer on the impact of the final outcome was
crucial. Without the skill of this one actor, events would have been much
different. It further concludes that the reorganization of Montreal by
this developer and later public policy was one that very much facilitated
the profitable expansion of finance capital.
Thesis Supervisor: Kevin A. Lynch, Professor of City Design.
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INTRODUCTION
The Intent and Structure of the Thesis
Montreal changed suddenly and dramatically in the early 1960's.
In a very short time, the city developed a skyline of new aluminum,
steel, and glass towers clustered within a short distance of one another.
The pattern of the city was transformed. The new core marked the center
of business activity, and the old financial center -- housed behind
neo-classical masonry facades in Vieux Montreal -- faded from prominence.
Montreal had come of age.
This thesis concerns itself with the forces that change cities,
and how these work. The case study format is therefore used to learn
what features of a fairly isolated event can be pointed to as being
important to a result, and in what way these might be important. The
event in this case study is isolated to the extent that it deals with
the construction of a single building in a particular (short) period of
time. The events leading to its construction are tracable. The
circumstances surrounding the construction of this one building will serve,
I believe, as a useful summary of the wider processes of change taking
place at that time.
The thesis examines a physical result -- the Place Ville Marie complex
2in Montreal -- and explores the relationship between a social, political,
and economic context and the tangible form of the outcome. The work is
therefore structured in two parts. The first (Chapters One to Three)
tells the story: the circumstances leading up to the decision to build
the project, the process of realizing that project (both as a development
effort and as a physical design), and a description of the short and
longer range impacts the effort precipitated. The second part (Chapter
Four.) attempts to extract the important influences that were active in
realizing the outcome as it now exists.
The limits of time and resources has necessarily circumscribed
this study. The principle actor (William Zeckendorf), furthermore,
passed away in 1976. Fortunately he has left behind an account of the
Place Ville Marie project -- the one he considered his crowning
achievement. This account has been heavily drawn upon here, and forms
the core of the description of the events. It has been filled out, however,
with the recollections of active participants at the time, as well as
by data drawn from many other sources.
Notwithstanding the contributions of many people and these data,
the author remains entirely responsible for factual accuracy, misinter-
pretations, and the views contained in the work.
I hope the effort is of some interest.
The City of Montreal:
Montreal is the largest city in Canada, although narrowly so ahead
of Toronto. It is also the second-largest French-speaking city in the
world. The dual nature of Montreal's history and of its people has played,
and will continue to play, a crucial role in its growth. Place Ville
Marie was no exception.
Montreal is located on an island near the confluence of the St.
Lawrence and Ottawa Rivers. It is an old city by North American standards--
first settled in 1642. For a long time, the city was to grow laterally
along the river contained on the northwest by Mount Royal and on the
southeast by the river itself. The city later grew to spread around
the mountain; expanding both east and west, across the river to the
southeast, and across the island to the northwest. The population grew
from its initial fifty to the 2.7 million inhabitants of today. At the
time we are considering here, the city had a population of 1.4 million.
As we shall see, the city's economic importance arose by virtue of
its position on the St. Lawrence River. The Lachine Rapids, just a
short distance beyond the present center of Montreal, was a barrier to
further inland navigation by ship. All further inland traffic must
change its mode (to other types of craft, or other smaller ships) at
Montreal.
The area the study will focus upon is the old city, Vieux Montreal,
and an area slighly to the west. There is an escarpment following the
line of La Gauchetiere Street that creates an upper city and a lower one.
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The point at which Place Ville Marie was built was upon the upper shelf --
on the plateau. Below was the lower land and Vieux Montreal, the
outgrowth of the fortified town of Montreal. Above the plateau stands
Mount Royal, now an urban park, and always an important geographical
feature. These would all figure prominently in the transformations
the city would undergoe with Place Ville Marie.
CHAPTER ONE: THE BACKGROUND FOR CONTEMPORARY CHANGE
In Place Ville Marie, Montrealers witnessed a change most residents
thought unlikely. Although economic conditions were considered good in
the fifties, the central city was suffering. Downtown growth, a positive
sign of health, favored Toronto, not Montreal. The roots of change
often reach beyond the immediate situation, however. This new structure
found its origins before the decade of its construction; beginning in
a period in which the railways dominated the economy, and evidenced in
the events that resulted in the Canadian National Railway.
The Canadian Northern Railway:
The railways were important to the growth of material wealth in
North America since the mid-nineteenth century. The growing railway
transportation network facilitated natural resource extraction and
commodity production and distribution; shaping the pattern of western
settlement, and reshaping the cities of the east. The locations of
railway rights-of-way, freight, and passenger facilities were very
carefully considered. The criteria were usually profitable operation
and expansion.
Montreal's location was important to railway growth. The city had
become a major port connecting inland waterways to the sea. Ocean
vessels could travel no further up the St. Lawrence River than the
island of Montreal at the Lachine rapids. The traffic from the Great
Lakes and other tributaries could travel no further downstream. The
commerce of the European fur trade established this transfer point
as a center of business. As the demand for furs waned, other commodities
replaced them, particularly the staples of grain and lumber. The
accessibility to such resources was, for all intents, infinitely
expanded by the railways. Montreal's port served as a key link to
European markets -- at that time the more profitable outlets. The
connection was important because the alternative was to remain part of
a restricted local economy and demand.
There were two large railway companies operating in the Montreal
area after 1880: the Grand Trunk and the Canadian Pacific. The
former operated primarily in the east with lines to New Brunswick and
the eastern United States. The latter had been commissioned and
chartered by the Federal Government (under prime minister John A.
MacDonald) to construct a rail connection to British Columbia and the
Pacific.
Canadian Pacific was the only transcontinental railway in Canada
for many years. During that time, they enjoyed the benefits of their
position. The right-of-way across the prairie was placed in the fertile
southern belt, and government concessions allowed them to set unregulated
freight rates. It was also given title to vast tracts of land on
either side of the right-of-way. The company monopolized the profit of
western settlement and agricultural production; carrying passengers
(usually European immigrants) to the farm settlements, and returning
their production to the markets in the east and in Europe.
By the turn of the century, at least one group of enterprising
entrepreneurs challenged Canadian Pacific's transcontinental monopoly.
The basis of that challenge was a new agricultural development: a
short season breed of wheat. This allowed cultivation in the less
favorable climate of the northern prairies. Sir William MacKenzie
and Sir Donald Mann undertook the dramatic expansion of their local
Lake Manitoba Railway and Canal Company northwestward to the Pacific.
Their ambitions were considerable; they soon completed their westward
push, and thereafter turned their attention toward the e'ast --
particularly to Montreal. There they would link with the eastern and
European markets.
Montreal Facilities:
A passenger and freight terminal in Montreal was considered vital
in an attempt to become a transcontinental competitor. The problem for
MacKenzie and Mann was how best to enter Montreal to compete with two
well established railways; both with good passenger and freight terminal
locations. The available options were extremely limited. Both of the
earlier railway companies located their passenger terminals as close
to the downtown area as they could without encountering the high
land values of that area. Canadian Pacific, for example, built
stations both to the east and west of the downtown area. The Grand
Trunk had built theirs to the west. Canadian Pacific's Windsor Station
particularly was felicitously located upon the lip of an escarpment
that marked the edge of the English well-to-do residential area and
promised to be, as development slowly drifted west, an area of considerable
importance. Both companies were also well connected with the freight
areas at the port and industrial belt adjacent to the river.
MacKenzie and Mann were widely known to be audacious railway men.
There was vigorousness and daring in their westward expansion. There
would have to be equal daring in their entry to Montreal. A preliminary
survey of the problem showed little promise. "Coming from the west,
the obvious route was either to make some arrangement with the Grand
Trunk or to come in with an independent line between it and the C.P.R." 1
The former was a distasteful alternative. Congestion on the Grand
Trunk line would be increased, and the numerous level crossings on this
route were already a source of friction with the city administration
and local residents. The latter alternative involved massive expenditures
and "destruction... of private property." 2 The gain from either of
these alternatives was questionable; H. K. Wicksteed, the Chief
Engineer, expressed it as follows:
When completed, there would be only a passenger station in
a good, but not exceptionally good, situation, and it would
be for all time a "dead end" station similar to those
already existing, and Quebec and other eastern or northern
lines would be forced many miles off the direct route, or
else have to leave as before from an independent station
in the east end. .3
Wicksteed abandoned any proposal to approach Montreal from the
southwest. He proposed instead an approach from the north coming around
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or through the barrier of Mount Royal, thereby making it possible to
build terminal facilities not only close to downtown, but also between
the French and English residential areas.
Freight was even more important. The two sources of freight
traffic were the harbor and the industries flanking the Lachine canal.
Positioning the passenger station too far east would cut off a through
connection with the waterfront. Downtown Montreal lay in between just
a few feet above the high water line. Any attempt to tunnel under,
build over, or cut through this dense part of town was financial folly.
Positioning the station too far west meant crossing the rights-of-way
of the Grand Trunk and C.P. to achieve a through connection to the
waterfront and industry.
The area between these two barriers, however, was a fuzzy one at
best. It was an area of transitory uses and ill-established image.
This area was a clear opportunity to link the passenger station (and
the tunnel line to the north) to the waterfront, industry, and their
freight traffic.
This suggested an optimal area for the station. The method of
getting by the mountain remained to be resolved. Two alternatives were
considered: a route flanking the mountain; and a tunnel directly
through it. The first meant the purchase of a surface property, its
excavation, and refilling after track and earthwork construction was
complete. The experience in New York during the construction of their
subway system suggested that "cut and cover" construction was extremely
expensive, compared to tunneling in favorable ground. Wicksteed opted
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for this second alternative; avoiding higher costs and the necessity to
purchase surface property.
The company then began to assemble land for this scheme. They
required land for marshalling yards, maintenance shops, freight
handling, and passenger facilities.
To obtain the necessary land and keep prices at a realistic
level, the company engaged the services of a real estate
agent, F.B. Shaw, of Carrick Limited. He succeeded in
acquiring from James Mahar who had also planned to develop
the area between Mount Royal and the Back River all his
property options. Shaw and a team of notaries also succeeded
in buying several farm tracts in the adjacent areas. 4
The company therefore succeeded in securing an enormous quantity
of land north of the city. They owned much more than they needed.
Some of the additional land was used for speculative development.
The "model city" garden suburb of Town of Mount Royal was initiated
around the railway line as it emerged from the north side of the
mountain.
These initial acquisitions were only the first steps. This
real estate activity did not escape the acuity of local entrepreneurs.
Any attempt to use Shaw to buy land within the city was far too risky.
The company therefore commissioned different agents to attempt to
assemble land between City Councillors , Alymer, Sherbrooke, and St.
Catherine Streets. News of impending transactions leaked out, however,
and that location was abandoned as speculative activity snowballed.
The company found another area between Cathcart LaGauchetiere,
Mansfield, and St. Monique Streets just as suitable. Great caution was
exercised with this attempt, however "several agents were jointly
employed and their operations so diffuse and widespread... "5 that
they managed to assemble the necessary land without arousing any
suspicion or further speculation.
Freight facilities were neatly integrated into the plan by taking
advantage of the terminal site's topography with respect to that
fuzzy zone leading to the waterfront. If the tracks were continued at
the same elevation through the Mount Royal tunnel to the new terminal,
they "came out into daylight at LaGauchetiere Street and high enough
to clear the streets on the lower level, while the land ran almost
without a curve into the most desirable perhaps of any individual district
for a freight terminal in the city, ...." 6 Twenty thousand square feet
of land was purchased at the base of this alignment and between the
port and industrial area to serve as the Canadian Northern freight yards.
Formation of the Canadian National System:
William MacKenzie and Donald Mann announced their intentions to
the Montreal public on 9 January 1912. They described their dramatic
tunnel entry to the city, their right-of-way extending from north of the
mountain to the river, their large marshalling yards to the west of
the city, the "Model City" at the northern exit of the tunnel that was
to become "a beautiful suburb of greater Montreal..." 7 (and, it was
hoped, provide profit enough to more than pay the cost of the entire
development!), and finally their intention to move their head offices
from Toronto to the new terminal station complex in Montreal. Construction
began soon after.
The tunnel and terminal station were completed in April of 1917.
The anticipated growth of immigration -- the fundamental reason for
speculative expansion -- never materialized however. The war in
Europe reduced it to a trickle. The growth in the west and the economic
gain this meant was seriously compromised. Based as it was on the
anticipation of this growth, so too was the financial stability of the
Canadian Northern. The war also diverted a great part of the urban
labor force to war production leaving few, at a high price, for railway
construction. Concurrently, an influenza epidemic kept ridership on
the new system to a minimum. The railway was now floundering.
The hardship was widespread. Many railway companies found themselves
in a similar situation -- particularly the smaller ones. But even the
Grand Trunk Railway was in trouble. It abondoned its own western
expansion effort -- the Grand Trunk Pacific -- to government receivership.
The parent line similarly succumbed to its difficult financial
situation a short time later.
The vigorous expansion and spending of the Canadian Northern to
compete transcontinentally and in Montreal was ill-timed. The federal
government absorbed the bankrupt lines one-by-one in order to maintain
their services; acquiring the Canadian Northern on 16 November 1917.
Finally, an Act of Parliament incorporated the growing government
railway lines as the Canadian National Railway Company in 1919. The
Grand Trunk joined the growing list on 1 May 1920.
Later Attempts at Development:
The new railway company inherited a great deal in Montreal. It
now owned the Grand Trunk's Bonaventure Station a block south of
Canadian Pacific's Windsor Stati6n, their extensive freight and
marshalling facilities, as well as the Victoria Bridge. The Canadian
Northern contributed its superbly located tunnel terminal and extensive
land holdings.
The government persuaded Sir Henry Worth Thornton -- an
American railway man from Pennsylvania, and the first American to run
a British railway system (the great Eastern Railway in England) --
to assume the presidency of the new company in January 1923. Thornton
was immediately consumed by the business of organizing a railway that
was inefficient owing to extensive duplication of formerly competative
lines. Part of that reorganization involved the Montreal tunnel terminal.
His intention was to unify all rail traffic in the city into a single
"Central Station" at this location. He viewed this proposed central
terminal as a great and important complex for both the railway and
the city. He was not without precedent. Thornton was well aware
of the situation of Grand Central Station in New York. 8 This great
station catalysed growth around it, and took advantage of this by
building over tracks in such a way that rail traffic continued beneath.
These "air rights" developments were of considerable interest. Thornton
evidently considered the Montreal terminal site an opportunity to
achieve a similar result.
The Canadian Pacific Railway did not approve of the proposed
combined facilities. They argued that similar facilities could be
developed at Windsor Station with considerable savings. In an effort
to resolve the issues, the federal government commissioned an independent
railway consultant from London -- Sir Frederick Palmer -- to examine
and evaluate rail transportation facilities and operations in Montreal,
and recommend methods for their improvement. The study endorsed the
concept of integrating the stations of both railways on Canadian National's
tunnel terminal site. The report generated some controversy, however.
Yet another report was commissioned,this time by private interestswhich
dismissed Palmer's findings. Through all this, Canadian Pacific remained
adamently opposed to this plan for a combined station. Thornton.
finally proceeded with a proposal for a complex that would be Canadian
National's terminal and head office quarters solely.
The proposal considerably extended the original site of the
Canadian Northern terminal. The Canadian Railway and Marine World
~m~r. '. (Vc' ViAwtcr tic iic'-rfth #t
described the area expropriated for the new terminal proposal in
November of 1927:
Many well-known buildings are within the area expropriated.
The Church of St. Andrew and St. Paul, at the corner of
Dorchester and St. Monique Streets, all of the buildings
fronting on Belmont Park, such as the Royal Edward
Institute, the Irish Protestant Benevolant Society Home
and Andrew's Home; St. Patrick's Academy at the corner
of LaGauchetiere and Ste. Genevieve Streets, are some
of these edifices. Belmont Park itself is wholly9
affected; St. Monique Street, too, is covered.
A federal committee studied the proposal and recommended the
approval of the 50 million dollar expenditure for the project. Thornton
was given permission to proceed with construction in T929.
Construction began with the excavation of expropriated lands and
the building of a viaduct along the path of Dorchester Street that
spanned the hole that was opened up. Not very much more was to happen.
All work was ordered stopped on October 4, 1931 as the wavefront of
financial disaster spread beyond its epicenter on New York's Wall Street.
All was not well with the railway even before the devastating
collapse in New York. Thornton was testifying before a Royal Commissi.on
into railway operations in 1931. Both Canadian National and Canadian
Pacific were losing money. The controversy focused on the competition
between these companies and the duplications of facilities this encouraged.
The logic of Thornton's grand plan in Montreal seemed questionable.
Again, he argued for a joint facility along the lines of his original
proposal:
Terminal facilities are the most expensive luxuries on which
railways are compelled to embark. My own feelings as a
professional transportation man is this, that wherever terminal
facilities can be made joint, money is saved by the railways and
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greater convenience furnished to the public.... 10
Thornton's plan ended here. The depression decisively buried it.
Thornton was finally forced to resign as the argument in the Royal
Commission contirued.
* * * *
- A much more modest version of Thornton's plan reappeared in 1938
as a make-work project initiated by the federal government to liven
the depressed economy in Montreal. The public relations statements
pointed out that the Central Station building (completed in 1943) was
the first step in the development of the area. A hotel and office
quarters (for Canadian National and others) were expected to follow.
The station remained unaccompanied for almost twelve years however.
Meanwhile Montrealers lived with the enormous excavation filled
with railway tracks in the center of what was quickly becoming a major
commercial area.
Visions of a scheme like that originally intended by Thornton
and again proposed in 1943 (with the opening of Central Station)
seemed to be reawakened in the mid-fifties. In 1959 Canadian National
finally built a hotel north of the station concourseand the International
Civil Aviation Organization had earlier erected a building on the
eastern edge of the site in 1951. The next project to be built, however,
radically changed the form of those visions beyond anything previously
conceived.
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CHAPTER TWO: BUILDING PLACE VILLE MARIE
Determining the Developer:
A major department store in this area of Montreal -- the Robert Simpson
Company -- was adversly affected by a lack of parking space. Suburban
shopping centers and their better accessibility by automobile were the
source of major competition with the central city stores. Adequate parking
facilities downtown was an increasingly troublesome issue.
Both of Simpson's major competitors -- Morgans' and Eaton's--
seemed geographically better capable of solving their problem. James
Bryant was therefore dispatched by the general manager, A.H. Lofft, to
find some solution to the store's parking space troubles. Mr. Bryant
examined alternative parking garage designs and inspected nearby sites
that could be cleared in order to build a garage. He recounts that he
was in the habit of walking by the Canadian National excavation on his
way to and from Central Station as he commuted from his home in the Town
of Mount Royal.
One day, as I walked passed the excavation, I was dazzled by the
obvious: all we had to do to have the best department store
parking garage in North America was to fill in the hole with
layers of parking decks. 1
According to Bryant, it was at this point that the name of William
Zeckendorf came up. Lofft had been familiar with recent business literature
which extensively covered the activities of this entrepreneur and his real
estate development company of Webb and Knapp in American urban renewal
programs. Lofft suggested that perhaps a parking garage and other
facilities "was a project for Mr. Zeckendorf ... " 2 Lofft then called
Zeckendorf to arrange a meeting in New York for the next day. Zeckendorf
was "indeed interested in the 'hole' -... "3 He asked Lofft to attempt
to organize a meeting that would include E.G. Burton, president of Simpson's,
and Donald Gordon, president of Canadian National.
This is not the version of the story Zeckendorf recounts. He
remembered his first contact from Montreal to be Senator Thomas Viene
and real estate agent Rudolf Lemire.
My guests had with them a map showing the holdings of the
Canadian National Railways (CNR) in Montreal. They suggested
that we acquire the lease and build up those twenty-two acres
of downtown land. 4
To prove his point about Lofft's initial contact, Bryant consulted
Canadian National files. In a memo from Donald Gordon dated 22 October
1953, there was a reference to a talk he had with E.G. Burton concerning
a parking garage. In the corner of another memo dated 26 October 1955
which summarized a meeting with Burton and Lofft, Gordon scribbled a note
to the effect that these men wanted him to contact William Zeckendorf.
It is not unlikely that Zeckendorf was contacted by both these groups.
The conclusion to be drawn from this is the growing interest in Canadian
National's open land. The highly visible activities of U.S. urban revitali-
zation was a model of considerable interest to the business community at
least.
Whether Lofft or Viene and Lemire were the instruments of the first
meeting is unimportant. Zeckendorf decided to fly to Montreal with his
son to survey the situation himself and "meet this fellow Gordon ... " 5
Zeckendorf's account of the meeting and his subsequent proposal of a Master
Plan for Canadian National's land makes the process seem quick and
straight to the point. Bryant presents some evidence that the delibera-
tions on the Webb and Knapp appointment by Gordon were more lengthy;
possible spanning more than a year:
A final memo from Mr. Gordon addressed "Note for file" dated
December 7, 1955, includes "Since my luncheon of October 26
with Mr. Burton the question of the Webb and Knapp appointment
has not progressed very far." 6
The first contact between Lofft and Zeckendorf took place "as early
as the fall of 1953 and no later than April 1954 ..." Bryant contended.
Serious deliberations on development continued from that time culminating
in Zeckendorf's committment for a 250,000 dollar master planning proposal,
undertaken at his own cost, for Canadian National in late 1955. He
offered the proposal with no strings attached. If the railway approved
of the proposal, they would then proceed with an outlining of obligations
and costs -- the detailed contents of the "deal" between Webb and Knapp
and Canadian National.
Through early 1956 Gordon and I held a series of meetings
to hammer out just how we would work with one another on the
project .. Normally such agreements are long and involved
treatises which lawyers concoct with legal language which
consumes page after page, but by now Gordon and I trusted
each other so fully that what we produced was a concise
two-page affair in simple English. 8
The agreement was certainly not an off-hand affair. The objectives
of Donald Gordon and Canadian National were clear: to make money on an
31
increasingly important and valuable piece of land. Gordon understood
the revenue potential of putting surplus land to profitable use. The
partnership of landowner and building developer was a logical one.
Canadian National was primarily a transportation corporation with govern-
ment defined limits on their operating domain. They were not directly
in the business of land development, at least not in the form suggested
here. The motivation was succinctly described by Gordon:
This approach seemed realistic because in many cities across
Canada we owned strategically located property from the point
of view of business and commercial, as well as industrial,
development. 9
CN would, of course, let their land only with provision of a very
healthy financial stake in the outcome of any venture. Gordon goes on
to outline Canadian National's terms of agreement with Zeckendorf
(and, later, with other developers).
1. Basic or ground rent based on either:
a) A percentage of the municipal assessment, or the market
value, of the property under lease, or
b) A percentage of the'gross receipts accruing to the developer,
with a minimum based on an appropriate percentage of the market
value ...
2. Supplementary Rent based on either:
a) A percentage of the net profit from the undertaking, or
b) A percentage of the gross receipts above certain predetermined
levels.
3. Full reversionary rights, whereby all buildings, structures
and improvements on the premises upon the expiration of the
lease, revert to the railway. 10
Zeckendorf commissioned I.M. Pei and Partners of New York to begin studies
of the site and prepare the Master Plan for presentation to Canadian National.
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Development of a Scheme:
Although the entire twenty-two acre site was the object of the
Master Plan, the area above Dorchester Boulevard and below Cathcart
Street was the most important for Zeckendorf -- an area of about seven
acres. Henry N. Cobb, the architect in charge of the project, was given
no directions. His original sketches reflected an attitude of accruing
development, two towers and a host of lower buildings that could be
constructed in stages according to the financial success of the initial
stage. But in this project "Zeckendorf's imagination was more important
than mine," said Cobb. The attitude to the project was determined
during a flight (over Montreal) in Zeckendorf's DC-3. He studied the
site as the airplane circled over the city.
As I began to sense what was missing, I said "Henry, I want
to tell you something ... you don't make 'melly' out of a -
blue white diamond." The minute I explained that "melly"
are merely the bits and chips left ?ver when a great diamond
has been cut, he saw what I meant. 12
His instructions to Cobb became more explicit. "I want one building
which will contain at least 35,000 square feet per floor and 1.5 million
square feet all-together, and it must give identity to more than one
major tenant." 13 The cruciform plan of the tower was the response to
this direction. It allowed up to four major tenants to achieve some
separate identity essentially due to four distinct lobby areas sharing
the central elevator core (the offices of one group were not organized
into single wings; i.e., each wing identified with a single tenant,
as the shape might imply). This tower was placed on a podium which spanned
the existing excavation. The podium contained two parking decks and
a retail level. The topography of the site allowed the retail level to
be reached directly off Cathcart Street (at the same level), while
the plaza level (the top surface of the podium) flanked Dorchester
Boulevard just a few stairs different in elevation. Cobb described
the plaza as a "great plain at the level of Dorchester." 14 Cobb
positioned low pavilion -like buildings at the perimeter of the podium.
The low buildings accentuated the tower and provided exhibition-type
space in this original scheme.
The architects were uncertain of the potential for retail space in
the project. Larry Smith, a prominent market consultant, was commissioned
to study the potential for retail in such a complex. The report concluded
that only marginal retail seemed possible. According to Cobb, Zeckendorf
picked up the report from his desk when it arrived, read it, and promptly
disposed of it in his waste paper basket. He instructed Cobb to cram
every square foot of retail space under the plaza that he could.
The Master Plan was developed "to unify rail, air, bus, and
automobile facilities in one central location ... " 15 Aside from the
cruciform tower and its adjacent buildings there was a parking structure
for the railway station, and a "trade mart." There was also a heliport
for "rapid- access between outlying airports and the downtown area ... "16
Gordon was impressed with the plan,and the proposal was made to
the board of directors of Canadian National in September of 1957.
The plan and lease agreement was approved by the federal government
in December of the same year. Zeckendorf now had his lease, and a plan.
He now meant to implement it. It would cost an estimated one hundred
million dollars.
preliminary scheme
View looking toward McGill University and Mount Royal
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Financial Manowners:
The project had now become a real one for Zeckendorf. Webb and
Knapp (Canada) Limited was formed to carry out the project. On
the advice of John McCloy, then chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank,
Zeckendorf established credit relations with the Royal Bank of Canada,
the largest bank in Canada at that time.
The real estate activity of Webb and Knapp (Canada) Limited
began with the purchase of the Dominion Square Building which was one
block west of the project site. The financial backing for the purchase
was arranged through the Royal Bank. The building was to serve as the
project headquarters.
In the meantime, armed with our basic agreement with Gordon,
we set out to lay a monetary base for our new Canadian company.
Graham Mattison, a lawyer and driving force in the New York
investment firm of Dominick and Dominick, handled this job.
His company, which had a strong branch office in Montreal,
created a consortium of Canadian merchant banks to underwrite
a package of bonds, convertible debentures, and common stocks,
most of which Mattison was able to place through banking
connections in Switzerland. This issue brought in some twenty-
five million dollars which almost immediately began bearing
interest at 5 percent. 17
In order to generate some income in Canada, Webb and Knapp arranged
numerous interim investment projects to keep the capital in circulation.
The first of these was the purchase of 277 gas stations all belonging
to the Belgian based petroleum refining company: Canadian Petrofina
Limited, to whom they, in turn, leased them "for ten percent, which,
right away, gave us one million dollars against our investment payments..."18
The gas stations were sold one-by-one as more capital was required
for the project. Similar activities spanned the country. For example,
regional suburban shopping centers were built in London, Ontario and
Vancouver, British Columbia that would help finance the Montreal effort.
Zeckendorf's immediate problem was to secure lease committments
for space in the project. A brochure was prepared using photographs
of the model that was built for the presentation to Canadian National.
Zeckendorf then approached prospective consumers of the space: major
corporations, insurance companies, and so on. The reception was cool.
Architect Henry Cobb, who accompanied Zeckendorf to all his meetings,
remembered the meeting with Canadian Industries Limited to be a particularly
gruesome one. Zeckendorf considered the "freeze" a result of both
anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism.- His style and project, he also
contended, "threatened the stuffily stable state of affairs down at
St. James Street ... 19 He believed the business community feared
having their "dark panelled offices made obsolete," as well as the
"dangerously radical" shift of the major office quarters from St.
James Street. 20 Meanwhile he had let foundation and excavation contracts
amounting to five million dollars.
Zeckendorf was certain that internal power games and politics
among the corporations stood in the way of his making any progress with
the lease committments. He called it "a cold Canadian front," and
summarized the problem to his son:
"...you know why we are not getting anywhere with this damn
thing (he quotes himself as saying)? Because we are tied in
with a powerhouse like Jim Muir (president of his chief
creditor the Royal Bank). His enemies are not going to take
a lease in there. And we haven't gotten anywhere with his
friends because they don't believe we are going to build.
There is a lot of prejudice and antipathy in Montreal.
They don't want Americans, and especially an American Jew
(myself) with a Chinese (Pei) for his top architect. These
guys are provincial as hell ... " 21
Finally Zeckendorf called his secretary into his office to dictate a
letter. He held out one of the brochures Webb and Knapp had prepared
and said "Take a letter: Dear Jim (Muir), here's a picture of your
new building." 22 Muir was astonished. He reminded Zeckendorf that
they already occupied the biggest bank building in Canada. He suggested that
perhaps it was that "goddamn Chinaman" (Pei) that was discouraging
prospective tenants. Zeckendorf argued that it was Muir who was
discouraging perspective tenants. He wanted him to move. Muir
retorted "You're mad." But Zeckendorf appealled to his corporate vanity:
"You will be king of the hill ... the business will come to you .. ," 23
and he also offered to buy the old building. Muir finally agreed that
at least he would await the result of a short study of the proposal.
So while Muir made a business trip to London, Zeckendorf's staff and
some members of the staff of the Royal Bank prepared a study.
The report (of course) endorsed the scheme. Muir finally agreed to
move the bank, but he wanted several concessions in return for the
bank's tenancy. Zeckendorf had already promised to name the tower the
Royal Bank of Canada Building, but Muir wanted a great banking hall at
the base of the tower:
This deistic design style has begun to fade in the United
States, but in Canada no self-respecting bank would ever
move into a building that did not boast a great cathedral
of a banking hall... 24
Although Zeckendorf does not mention the fact, Muir also insisted
that the bank acquire the reversionary rights of the lease for the tower
from Canadian National. That was the object of some sensitive negotiation
with Donald Gordon. An agreement was reached, however, the bank acquiring
the rights for approximately two million dollars .25
Thus, Zeckendorf finally broke that "cold Canadian front" in the
early part of 1958. Cobb was convinced that Muir's agreement to move
was more a result of Zeckendorf's personal flair -- his audacity.
"That's what got to Muir: the guts," he remarked.26 The architects
set to work revising the design to accomodate the bank.
* * * *
The financial strategy for this project began to take tangible
form. The Royal Bank lease represented an income stream of 2.6 million
dollars annually. Zeckendorf now had some leverage with which to search out
additional sources of capital. He approached the Metropolitan Life
Assurance Company to recure a loan of seventy-five million dollars.
His contact in this company was Fred Ecker with whom he had an off-the-
cuff understanding of his possible interest in financing Webb and Knapp's
ventures in Canada. Zeckendorf announced the committment the Royal Bank
had made to occupy seven floors, and he now wanted seventy-five million
dollars to build Place Ville Marie. Ecker told him he would lend only
fifty million, and thus would require another important tenant to commit
to a lease in the building.
Zeckendorf then contacted Aluminium Limited. The company was at the
time considering the construction of a building to serve as their head
office. Zeckendorf "romanced" them for weeks at one point telling
the company president: "I'd hate to have to put a bronze curtain
wall on this building." 27 He suggested instead that this building would
be "the greatest showcase for aluminum in all the history of Canada...', 28
By September of 1958, Aluminium Limited (now Alcan) was signed for
space in the Royal Building adding another two million dollars annually
to the developers income stream. The Montreal Trust Company and Air
Canada signed for space in the building shortly after; adding another
1.5 million dollars to the anticipated annual revenue.
Metropolitan Life agreed to provide the mortgage financing with the
committment of these additional tenants. Once this agreement had been
reached, Zeckendorf needed to procure money for immediate construction
financing. The money was provided by a group of U.S. -Banks on the basis
of the mortgage arrangement between Zeckendorf and Metropolitan Life.
The group was- extensive; including Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, the
Chase Manhattan Bank, and the Chemical Bank New York Trust Company
(all of New York City); the Northern Trust Company (of Chicago); the
Marine Trust Company (of Buffalo); the Cleveland Trust Company, and the
State Street Bank and Trust Company (of Boston). 29
Twenty-five million dollars still remained to be raised. While
efforts were made to locate possible sources for this capital, Zeckendorf
let the construction contracts,and Place Ville Marie began to rise from
the excavation and foundations that had been prepared.
The source of additional capital took approximately two years to
finally settle. During that time, Zeckendorf was forced to arrange interim
financing "at a walloping interest rate, because it would be far less
costly to keep the project going, even at high interest rates, than
to temporarily close it down ... "30
The search for additional capital took William Zeckendorf, Jr.
to England. He had originally met a London financier by the name of
Jack Cotton in Nassau to discuss the deal. The agreement, however,
was "contingent upon the Bank of England's approving this outflow
1,31
of cash from Britain ... Another one of Zeckendorf Jr.'s contacts
was Sir Kenneth Keith of the London based bank of Phillip, Hill, Higginson,
and Erlander. Should Cotton fail in his effort to get approval, this
group might have better luck. The Bank of England, as it turned out,
did refuse Jack Cotton's request, but Keith's backing of the project
was allowed to proceed. It remains totally unclear why Cotton's
request was refused. The bankers insisted: "We were able to phrase
our application correctly. Mayby Cotton didn't try hard enough." 32
Negotiations with the London investors took several months. The
deal resulted in the formation of a new company made up of the participating
interests. "Trizec," the new name of the company, thus consisted of Webb
and Knapp (Canada) Limited , 33 and the two British investors (for which
Sir Kenneth Keith acted as financial consultant): Eagle Star Insurance
Company, and Covent Garden Property Company Limited. Eagle Star, it
should be noted, owned controlling interests in Covent Garden Property.
During the period of negotiation, a structural problem arose in the
design of the cruciform tower. Computer analysis revealed a tendency for
the cruciform shape to induce a pin-wheel motion of the building about
its center during high wind loading conditions. The structural steel
framing design of I.M. Pei's consultants failed to account for it,
argued the Canadian engineers. These engineers were associated with the
steel supplier, and as a result Zeckendorf was convinced this "problem"
was nothing more than an endemic conservatism in Canadian engineering
practice. It was also self-serving from his point of view. The steel
company's chief aim, after all, was to sell steel, he argued. The
additional steel bracing would add five million dollars to the cost of
the structure. This was a considerable gap in the financing, and that
gap was filled by the British investors in Trizec:
Our partners ... arranged to supply more capital, and credit
for capital loans, in exchange for a proportionally greater
interest in Trizec, with Webb and Knapp holding the option
of reacquiring its percentage of the ownership in the project
upon repayment of the loans and interest. 24
The British group thus held controlling interests in the ownership
of Place Ville Marie before its completion in 1962. Shortly after
completion of the project, Webb and Knapp of New York was forced to
declare bankruptcy after apparently overextending themselves in their
U.S. operations. Trizec remained, but it was now controlled almost
exclusively by Eagle Star.
Metropolitan Life issued its mortgage for Place Ville Marie late
in 1962. The interim financing was therefore retired at that time.
Shortly afterward, a company called English Property Corporation bought
control of Trizec. Although this might have seemed to be a full change
in management; it was, in fact, an "all-in-the family transaction..." 35
Eagle Star actually owned 22 percent of English Property, and were thus
their biggest shareholder. Henry Aubin's research into the financial
foundations of Eagle Star revealed the insurance company to be "an
associate of one of the true colossi of global resource development,
the Anglo American Corporation of South African Limited, of Johannesburg..." 36
The Anglo American group -- control of which is in the hands of a very
few "discrete" international money-men -- had combined "operating
assets in 1973 of over $6 billion, enough to place it among the top
couple of dozen corporate groups in the world, at least ... " 37
This was the result of the younger Zeckendorf's search for additional
capital to finance his father's project in Montreal. This was also
to become a pattern of development financing for other projects in the
city after the building of Place Ville Marie.
The Final Scheme:
The signing of the Royal Bank for space in the project considerably
altered the scheme. The requirement for a banking hall of some magnificance
at the base of the tower was solved by adding four low buildings or
blocks between the arms of the cruciform. These were completely
opaque, and formed a cantilevered canopy at the ground by projecting
several feet beyond the glass walls at the perimeter of the base. Cobb
considered these additions a substantial improvement in the design.
The separate lobby identities that were the fundamental reasons for
the cruciform were reinforced by the addition of these blocks.
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Cobb remembered the presentation of the revised scheme to the
Royal Bank in May 1958 had followed a "mad charrette." 38 James Muir
walked into his board room that morning to find architects and model
makers sleeping on the floor. Far from tarnishing their professional
image, Muir was impressed by the intensity of the activity. He was also
capable of the same intensity. He never consulted his board for approval
of the project. That morning he simply announced to the directors as
they approached the boardroom that on the other side of the door was
their new headquarters building.
The final scheme presented to the board consisted of the cruciform
Royal Bank of Canada tower, and three lower buildings grouped around
an open space that formed the top surface of the podium. The shopping
concourse below this level was accessible from four wells in the plaza,
from stairways off Mansfield Street,and from doorways directly off
Cathcart Street. The two parking decks below the shopping concourse
were reached from the garage entrance on Cathcart Street at the base of
McGill College Avenue. This parking area served both Place Ville Marie
and the Queen Elizabeth Hotel. Truck servicing for the site -- particularly
for the shopping and restaurant areas in Place Ville Marie -- was
accessible from LaGauchetiere Street. An interior roadway allowed
trucks to drive under the surface streets to arrive at loading facilities
on the car-park level of the project.
Cobb originally intended the smaller buildings around the cruciform
tower to serve as low pavilions with theatre and exhibition space.
They were, in this revised scheme, office buildings. The two flanking
Cathcart Street would be four stories while the one facing Mansfield
(and the Sunlife building) would be thirteen stories. Cobb had little
to do with the decision about this last structure. Although he admits
the "enclosure" it gave the plaza was beneficial, the decision to build
it at that height was Zeckendorf's. The reason for it stems from
a conflict with Sunlife Insurance Company. Zeckendorf believed they
were nervous about the possible effects this project would have on the
rental space in their own building. As a result of that conflict,'
Zeckendorf asked Cobb to make the three-story building intended for the
Mansfield Street side of the site larger so that the Sunlife building
could not vicariously enjoy the plaza of Place Ville Marie. Cobb
increased it to six stories, but Zeckendorf wanted it still higher.
The thirteen stories finally satisfied his desire to cut off Sunlife
from his project. Cobb remarked that the seam on the model where the
additional ten stories were added was clearly visible.
Zeckendorf's primary interest was the tower. He was not that
concerned with the remainder of the scheme; trusting that his architects
would take good care of the ensemble. The one additional area causing
him some concern, however, was the shopping promenade -- particularly the
possible negative reaction of potential lessees to the underground space.
Cobb therefore had a large scale model built in which all the actual
lighting conditions were simulated, shop windows decorated, and human
figures introduced to establish scale. The reaction was negative, however.
Possible tenants considered it a basement. This response induced some
panic, and some leases for what Zeckendorf considered "second-string
retailers." 39  Cobb noted they were hard to remove once the success
of the project was established. Space that rented for six dollars
per square foot and only produced fifteen tenants at the opening of
the building soon rented for fifteen dollars per square foot with no
vacancies.
Political Maneuvers:
At the time of Zeckendorf's initiatives in Montreal, the city
administration, headed by Mayor Jean Drapeau, was occupied fighting a
campaign against "crime in the streets." 40 The issue of physical
development had not reached any level of general exposure or specific
concern in the city. The general tendency for Montreal to lose major
central city growth to Toronto had been establishing itself for many
years. The expectation was that Toronto would shortly ta-ke over Montreal's
distinction as the largest city in the country and the center of its
financial activity. The city administration thought it best to occupy
themselves with issues of more immediate concern: the visibility of
felony, prostitution, etcetera.
The city planning department had only been recently created (in
1941). Prior to 1963, its activities were limited to relieving traffic
congestion, preparing appraisals of the physical environment (density
studies and the condition of buildings), and the preparation of land
use guidelines for open space and recreation. Although some land use
studies labelled small areas "redevelopment," that issue was only
tangentially dealt with.
Place Ville Marie was the catalyst for an entirely new type of
planning department in 1963. This "Zeckendorf miracle" 41 had transformed
the central business district, but the energy of this expansion was
spontaneous. The city was anxious to direct that energy toward
"the logical solution to problems." 42 This meant two separate but
related things in practice. First, it was the concern for the health
of Montreal, and the realization that the city might, after all, retain
its first-place position in size and economic importance; second, that
it was an opportunity to redress a lingering inequality between the
French and the English.
Zeckendorf quickly became aware of the context in which he found
himself in the early phases of the project. He was also aware of a
"43
more general climate characterized by "strong spasms of .. anti-Americanism...,
that could hinder the attempts of an outsider to carry through development.
In the first category of predictable, avoidable trouble, I
destroyed one thousand copies of the first brochure my
aides put out on our Montreal project ... Quite unconsciously,
by what it did not way, this brochure dismissed Canada as a
mere state, another Illinois or Colorado where Webb and Knapp
of New York operated. 44
He was, however, to deal with the "complex and everpresent business of
things French versus things English waiting to trap the unwary from the
south" 45 day to day. He was very careful in avoiding the pitfalls
that might interrupt or paralyze his plans should he not be sensitive
enough to the issue.
The French/English issue was (and is) a deep and complex one. This
ethnic and class division has left its mark in the physical pattern of
Montreal. Place Ville Marie was very much a part of that pattern
because the conditions that.contributed to its construction (its location,
values of land nearby, and its connection to important features/in the
city) were bound up with an English identity and their control of economic
life in the city. For the French Canadian Montrealer, Place Ville Marie
was another triumph for English capital, but it was also a model that
might be exploited for the direct benefit of the French. This reasoning
would serve to launch a true version of urban renewal much as it was
practiced in the United States.
The historical roots of the French/English division are as old
as the settlement of the New World itself. This area of Canada had
-originally been settled by French colonists. The pattern of settlement
was, for the most part, feudal in structure; administration of the colony
being carried out by seigneurs, or manorial lords who controlled
distinct pieces of territory. These territories were, furthermore,
religious boundaries or parishes. The seigneurs were very often clergy
whose presence in Nouvelle France was intended to spread the borders
of the religious revival that was strongly felt in France in the early
17th century. Montreal was first settled in 1642 by just such a
seigneurial group -- fifty members of the French Associes de Notre Dame
pour la conversion des sauvages de la Nouvelle France en l'ile de Montreal.*
The settlement was known as Ville Marie.
* Society of Our Lady for the conversion of the nations of New France on
the island of Montreal.
The ties with France were also secular. The New World was a
virtually unlimited source of material wealth, and the religious
settlement of Ville Marie soon became the fur trading post of Montreal.
The language of commerce was, of course, French. The English-
speaking population in Montreal was absorbed even after the termination
of French rule in North America in 1760 -- for a short time at any rate.
The transformation of the position of English in the town to one of
dominance took place during the occupation of Montreal by the American
revolutionaries. Although the English population was increased, they
were still the minority. Yet the latent primary of "les Anglais"
rooted in an economy now linked to England manifested itself with
the infectious spirit and competition of American mercantilism. The
English Protestant merchants of Montreal slowly grew as a dominant class.
In the early years, the growing class differences did not appear
physically in the town. Montrealers, by-and-large, lived within the
fortified walls (or just outside them). The buildings were densely built
with shops and workspaces occupying the ground floor. The residential
quarters began above these. The wealthier English merchants occasionally
built their residences beyond the limits of the city. These first
appeared to the east of the town, but they increasingly favored the upper
plateau west of the city toward the summit of Mount Royal. The area
around was farm land, and these wealthy landowners on the hill found
pleasant surroundings and an unsurpassed view of the city below.
The growth of industrialization significantly altered that pattern.
The mixture in residential quarters disappeared. Factories and warehouses
-~lo -o 3 f Aa.m{
began to occupy the original town while workers' housing was built
just beyond the factories. The emerging residential segregation was
also linguistic. The more affluent English continued to withdraw from
the industrializing center to fill out those areas earlier inhabited
by the merchants; that is, to the western plateau. The French,
meanwhile, expanded eastward, first along the lowlands flanking the
river, then up upon the eastern extension of the plateau. The
"two cities" were very evident by the 1860's. Writes one historian
To the east, lived most of the French citizens, to the west
the English. And much of the civic power derived from the
latter; in business, finance, and industry the English
controlled the lion's share. 46
Later development intensified this segregation. The railways
found working class areas easier to penetrate than the areas of the well-
to-do. The freightyards and track alignments were adjacent to these areas.
The passenger facilities -- attempting to get as close as possible to
the central city without incurring high land values -- were placed at
boundary areas adjacent (and beneficial ) to the well-to-do residential
areas. The west-east, English-French character of Montreal became
increasingly entrenched.
The domination was, at an earlier time, accepted and rationalized
by such French Canadians as Monseigneur L.A. Paquet, who argued in 1902
that:
Our mission is less to handle capital than to stimulate ideas;
less to light the furnaces of factories than to maintain and
spread far and wide, the glowing fires of religion and thought ...
While our rivals are struggling for ... the power that stems
from industry and finance, ... our aspirations shall above all aim
to uphold the honour of the doctrine and to gain the palms of
apostleship. 47
The modern French Canadian, however, was no longer content with
such less tangible roles and benefits. They increasingly understood
their history to have been one of domination from the outside. Jean
Drapeau asked the question:
What remains to us? ... Agriculture, small scale manufacturing,
a small portion of banking, of retail trade and construction.
For the rest, we are more and more employees ... of large
English-Canadian, English and American companies. We are tending
more and more to become a proletarian people. 48
This was the situation into which Zeckendorf flew in late 1955 to
meet Donald Gordon. He was quickly introduced to the problems it might
create for development by the example of Canadian National's new convention
hotel which was under construction. It was the largest hotel in the
Canadian National chain; sited on the south side of Dorchester Street
over the railway tracks. A name for the hotel had not been decided
upon even as construction proceeded. The executives knew that this
was a sensitive point. An off-hand remark by Governor-General Vincent
Massey on a visit to Britain finally decided the issue. He wondered
aloud if the Queen might want such a grand hotel named in her honor.
Her majesty graciously accepted, and Canadian National had very little
choice -- the hotel was called the Queen Elizabeth. The "hoots and howls
of rage and frustration from French politicans and editors lasted for
months ... ," writes Zeckendorf of the incident. 49
He was not going to make such a mistake. He concluded "that
whatever name we chose for our project, it had better be French." 50 That
decision resulted in the choice of the profoundly historic name of Place
Ville Marie.
Mayor Drapeau, delighted with the name, immediately checked
with his eminance, Montreal's rdinal, Paul-Emile Leger,
who was equally enthusiastic.
In the political realm at least, the French presence was very real
for Zeckendorf. This alliance of church and state, of French language
and religion was just one of those "obstacles" that he had to somehow
steer past.
Zeckendorf did find himself involved. The architectural scheme
of Place Ville Marie was originally designed to bypass the St. James
Club, a "gentleman's club" that was the gathering point for the
English business elite. There were buildings being razed to make way
for Place Ville Marie, and the Mayor made his intention regarding the
St. James Club quite clear when he asked Zeckendorf and Cobb if they
happened to have a match. 52 Although Zeckendorf insists he did not
want nor was it necessary to destroy the building, its destruction was
a necessary political compromise. A similar French club had been
destroyed in the earlier process of widening some streets (presumably
on the impetus of English needs).
A Montreal cartoonist, French of course, depicted a last battle
with assorted (St. James) club members umbrellas drawn, standing
off the workmen and fending off the bulldozers with blasts
from seltzer bottlesi
The issue of Canadian Nationalism was not without its own presence
moreover. Zeckendorf writes that the newly elected conservative government
in Ottawa had ordered the Canadian National Railway to stop "its dalliance
with the devilish foreigners from the south." 54 Zeckendorf sought the
assistance of Louis St. Laurent, the leader of the opposition and himself
prime minister until that election of 10 June 1957, to help sway the
impending government vote on the leaseagreement with Canadian National
in his favor. He argued that Drapeau and Cardinal Leger were pleased
with the project which was- to be called Place Ville Marie. He further
gave assurances, in answer to St. Laurent's specific questioning, that
he would not be putting up small buildings to directly compete with
extant businesses in Montreal, nor would he be developing all 22 acres
of Canadian National's property. He pointed out that only seven acres
were to be developed by Webb and Knapp, and he would use this to build
"one great structure that would be to Montreal what the Eiffel tower
was to Paris." 55 St.Laurent promised his help as a result of that
conversation, and the lease was granted, by a narrow voting margin,
in December 1957.
Although Zeckendorf skillfully managed to avoid all the English,
French, and Canadian nationalist pitfalls that awaited him in Montreal's
unique political and social climate, his building, in spite of its name,
still consolidated the historic pattern of English domination. The
French were acknowledged as a force to be considered, but not as
initiators or controllers of a situation. Zeckendorf had built his Eiffel
tower, and the financial community, formerly on relatively neutral
turf on St. James Street,now shifted to the "colonial axis" -- the
area identified with English interests. Place Ville Marie was an
Eiffel tower in London.
Professional Reaction:
The details of design and the intentions of the project were
published by every major architectural journal and business periodical
while Place Ville Marie was under construction. Jan C. Rowan, for example,
devoted considerable attention to the project and its restructuring
of the city in the February 1960 issue of Progressive Architecture. He
began his assessment by lamenting the "chaotic cityscape" of present-day
cities:
In every civilization but ours, the city structure
reflected the concentration of economic and political
power. Today, a typical city is a vast, sprawling, and
incoherent agglomeration of unrelated structures lined'
along a criss-cross of similar traffic-choked streets. 56
The problems, he argued, were only exacerbated by hiding behind
dreams such as Le Corbusier's Ville Radieuse or the schemes of Lucio
Costa (the designer of Brasilia). The proce-ss of planning and design
must have "flexibility and adaptability to changing conditions ... " 57
Place Ville Marie had convinced Mr. Rowan of the feasibility of achieving
urban development "in an orderly fashion" through "the system of private
ownership and democratic government ... " 58
He carefully described the important constituent features of this
"orderly" development: the necessity of relieving congestion, of
facilitating access to the core of the city for the outlying regions,
and the development of large and important spaces in the city to replace
the degenerating smaller buildings. He therefore praised the proposed
development of a ring highway to facilitate access to Place Ville Marie,
and the instituting of a regional planning authority to carry out such
a proposal.
The plaza itself was of considerable interest as well. It served
both a commercial and civic function, Mr. Rowan points out, while the
"imposing monumental form" 59 of the cruciform tower hovers over the
space. It would serve as a gathering point visually linked to McGill
University and Mount Royal along an uninterrupted axis on McGill
College Avenue.
In his concluding remarks, Rowan admitted there may be dangers
involved in the introduction of a "new and alien scale" 60 into the
existing fabric. But there were only two other choices he argued.
There was the unrealistic option of a powerful "superauthority" that
could prescribe "idyllic" land uses like recreation to such important
properties, or (and this seemingly the worst) lot by lot development:
Such an unplanned and cancerous growth eventually results in
urban decay, a flight to the suburbs, and complete and 61disappearance of all urban qualities and metropolitan values.
I have paraphrased this article at length,not (entirely) to criticize Mr.
Rowan, b.ut because it succinctly illustrates the direction of professional
consciousness regarding the nature of the city and its ills, and why
Place Ville Marie was perceived as a fitting remedy to those perceived
ills.
The building was completed in 1962 with two buildings -unrealized:
the one facing the Sunlife building, and the one at the corner of Cathcart
and Mansfield. These were part of the financing scheme, however, and
they were completey shortly after. Two additional stories were added
to the Cathcart Street buildings in the late sixties.
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CHAPTER THREE: IMPACTS OF PLACE VILLE MARIE;
SPECULATION AND RENEWAL
The effects of Zeckendorf's vigorous activities in Montreal
precipated a new pattern of growth even before Place Ville Marie itself
was under construction. Speculation and bank rivalry quickly transformed
Montreal. This new appearance, and the conditions necessary for its
realization became a matter of policy for the city administration for
future development.
The Banks Compete:
Zeckendorf was aware at the outset of his activities in Montreal
that the city was absorbing approximately 300,000 square feet of office
space per year. The growth had indeed been of that magnitude. Since
World War II, 1.14 million square feet had been added to the available
office space while another approximately 955,000 square feet were protected
for completion in 1956 and 1957. Zeckendorf was not dealing with a
response to anticipated demand however. His efforts were directed
at an entirely different consideration of the market. He recounts that
during an early visit to Montreal in 1955, he arranged a luncheon with
real estate men from the city. He asked each of them to predict the
p.v.m. & speculation
square feet of office space that the city was able to absorb over the
next five years.
They wrote their predictions on slips of paper, which I
collected. Most estimates ranged from 300,000 to 750,000
square feet. I read these answers out. Then I cheerfully
announced that we would soon be starting on a four-million-
square-foot complex, which could be larger than the original
Rockerfeller Qenter. The faces at the table turned green
with horror.
As we have seen, Zeckendorf succeeded in acquiring the necessary
financial backing, and, more importantly, the right tenants for the
structure. He simply believed that the building he was to build more
closely matched the needs of what he called "the great corporations."
It was to him a qualitative distinction in the nature of the accomodation
he was providing.
Ris own assumptions seemed to have been verified by the sudden
'acceleration in speculation on just this type of space. This activity
added another 1.5 million square feet of space to Place Ville Marie's
3.4 million square feet of space in its final form. This was considerably
beyond the less than one-half million square feet per year the city had
been accommodating.
Three buildings were simultaneously rising to dominate the skyline
of Montreal. A third would begin construction shortly after the others
were completed. The real estate and financial activity that accompanied
Place Ville Marie, moreover, was directly responsible for the other
three buildings that were constructed. The first of these was the result
of what appeared to be bankers' rivalry.
Zeckendorf mentioned the caution with which James Muir (of the Royal
Bank) proceeded to operate after deciding to move the head office to
Place Ville Marie. He publicly announced that the bank only intended
to lease space in the new building. Zeckendorf explained this strategy
as an attempt to "keep away any competitors from making a similar move
away from St. James Street and onto the high ground in midcity
(and) to reap the advantages of being the sole bank in a modern office
and a new location ...." 2
The Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce was not to be outfoxed.
With their developers and design team, the bank prepared a scheme for
a new building uptown. The site they chose was at the corner of Peel
and Dorchester, and was presently occupied by the Windsor Hotel --
an.old and elegant hotel on Dominion Square. The property was held by
the Royal Bank, yet through a lack of perspicacity on the part of a bank
official, the Canadian Imperial Bank acquired a lease without Muir's
knowledge. The person involved was apparently not aware of the suspicion
or fear of any competitive development efforts. The fury of Muir's
reaction to the news of the transaction was remembered long after. The
bank official responsible was given a "fierce tongue-lashing" for his
part in extending "aid and succor to the enemy." 3
Muir was concerned enough about the competition to seek ways of
compromising the financial feasibility of the rival project:
Muir was especially delighted to learn that, by city regulations,
his competitors had to provide suitably spacious parking
facilities within five hundred feet of their building. If
they could not, they would be required to dig down through solid
rock for the four or more extra floors to supply the necessary
parking area ... The only available parking site was the
Tilden Garage, and Muir immediately had us (Webb and Knapp,
Canada Limited) buy it with his money. 4
This attempt to sabotage the project's financial feasibility
failed however. Zeckendorf believed that "friends" in the city
administration assisted by "properly" interpreting the applicable
by-laws.
CIL House:
The other structure that appeared concurrently with Place Ville
Marie and the Canadian Imperial Bank was the CIL House -- the head
offices of Canadian Industries Limited. Much earlier, they had been
approached by'Zeckendorf about their possible occupation of Place Ville
Marie. At that time, CIL refused to even consider the possibility.
Now they hastened to relocated in a new tower.
The building was developed by a local entrepreneur named Ionel
Rudberg, who was one of Zeckendorf's guests atthe luncheon he sponsored
for the real estate community. The increasing momentum of the Place
Ville Marie project, and the visible activity that Zeckendorf ensured
was taking place in the excavation both stimulated Rudberg into an
attempt of his own, and induced Canadian Industries Limited to reconsider
their present location at the corner of St. Catherine Street and McGill
College Avenue. Rudberg offered the company the additional incentive
to move into his new building by offering to purchase their old building
for five million dollars.
Rudberg's competition with Place Ville Marie had some tangible
effects on the project. Cobb had designed a long platform which
extended the plaza of Place Ville Marie from Cathcart Street up to the
busy commercial strip of St. Catherine Street. This was considered to
be an extremely important feature of the scheme as a needed connection
for the shopping promenade below the plaza level with the retail
activity in St. Catherine Street. The proposal, however, required a
street widening and demolition of some buildings along McGill College
Avenue. This was an issue for City Council. Rudberg, "worried about
a possible five-million-dollar turkey" (the old CIL building)," 5
resisted the proposal at the city council. He also persuaded CIL, who
would still own and occupy the building until his new one was completed,
to write a letter to the city protesting the proposal and its detrimental
effects on their (old) building. Zeckendorf's support in the city
administration was tenuous at the time. Jean Drapeau was deposed as
6
Mayor in the recent election. Rudberg's attempt, as a result, was
successful: the city voted down the proposal.
Zeckendorf was alarmed by the defeat. His concern was not
directly for the design, however. He was more immediately concerned
with the effects this would have on his financing arrangements.
Eliminating the platform would, he thought, jeopardize the success of
both the plaza and the shopping promenade. The reason for his concern
was the nervousness this would cause the insurance company that was about
to sign the mortgage agreement:
In the early negotiating stages, (they) can be quite flexible
about the details of a project, but become more and more rigid as
an agreement reaches the signing stage. By the time an arrange-
ment has been reached and written up into preliminary contract
form insurance companies have developed a ritual inflexibility
that only the priesthood of ancient Egypt may have been able
to equal. 7
The task was to convince Metropolitan Life that the link to St.
Catherine Street was not vital to the project. This was eventually
done, but not without convincing themselves of it.
Place Victoria:
The origin of this project was in Zeckendorf's earliest efforts
in Montreal. He was actively seeking out possible partnerships to
finance Place Ville Marie and other projects that -Webb and Knapp were
involved in. The Societa Generale Immobiliare contacted Zeckendorf
for just such "mutual projects" both in the United States and in Rome.
Immobiliare was a real estate investment and construction company
based in Rome.. They invited Zeckendorf and I.M. Pei to come to Rome
to investigate a project in the E.U.R. (just outside Rome) that might
begin the partnership. After spending some time there, however, it
became apparent to Zeckendorf that the contact was not to discuss
partnership, but it was a "Machiavellian game ... picking our brains
before moving in as our direct competitors both in Washington and in
Montreal ... " 8
Immobiliare also managed to hire one of Zeckendorf's vice presidents,
Nicholas Salgo, and with him they prepared plans for an office tower
in Montreal. The project was financed through a Belgian bank, and the
Montreal Stock Exchange would be its major tenant.
The project, although much larger than the other two competitors
of Place Ville Marie, was never to have great impact. Zeckendorf was
clear about its troubles:
It did not effectively tie itself into the existing communica-
tions system of which our project was the hub. Instead of
going up in one master stroke, Place Victoria was built
slowly and piecemeal ... only one of three originally proposed
towers has been completed; and this one tower is not filled,
despite discounted rents. 9
Immobiliare was not a small business faltering with a large project.
The company was then (and remains) a large one. Until 1971, it was
effectively controlled by the Vatican which, although owning only 15
percent of the stock, retained four of its financiers on the nine-man
board of directors. By 1971, the Church had "effectively liquidated"
its interests in Immobiliare. 10 The company remains active in Montreal
and other cities, however.
It owns housing projects in California, is building an airport
in Nairobi, sells high-rises in Paris, and remains, ...
Italy's biggest builder. In 1977 it controlled 120 companies,
of which about 70 are outside Italy. Perhaps its most famous
property is Washington's Watergate apartment complex. 11
Although the two additional towers of Place Victoria were never built,
Immobiliare has just completed (in October 1977) Montreal's 768-room
Hyatt Regency Hotel on the site adjacent to the existing tower which
was being held in anticipation of the second tower.
Henry Aubin's investigation into Immobiliare demonstrated some
financial ties as powerful as those of Trizec. The Vatican had
liquidated its shares in Immobiliare to the Paribas group -- "one
of France's two principle financial-industrial axes ... "1 12 This
transaction was made on behalf of Charles Bluhdorn, a banking client
and president of the Gulf and Western multi-national conglomerate.
A Milanese financier named Michele Sindona acquired this block of
control (from Bluhdorn). Sindona, however, was later arrested for his
apparently shadey financial maneuvers. His interests in Immobiliare
fell to Banca di Roma, a state-owned bank. They, in turn, sold those
interests to a group of Italian real-estate developers. An Expresso
reporter interviewed one of these real estate tycoons, Arcangelo
Belli, about his acquisition of Immobiliare:
Belli -- "... we all knew Immobiliare was the only concern which
in years to come could become a reference and
turning point in the changes which will occur
in the construction industry. So far we have
lived the era of cars; now we live the era of
new use of the land, cities, hospitals and
schools.
Expresso -- " Very good. You must feel guilty for what you did
to our cities then. And how do you want to 'arrange'
them now?
Belli -- "... alone I am nobody; as Immobiliare I can express
myself." 13
A New Pattern of Development:
The pattern of building established by Place Ville Marie soon
became a generalized pattern of development for the city. The formula
for successful private development was pursued and assisted by public
policy. Enormous sums of money was expended to actively support development
by private entrepreneurs by providing a favorable investment context,
both institutionally and physically, brought about by planning at
municipal and regional levels. 14
Part of that pattern was such notions of organization as the
"underground city" that spontaneously grew out of Place Ville Marie's
shopping concourse. Vincent Ponte, the planner working for Zeckendorf,
later development
described the pattern as a solution to pedestrian-vehicular conflict
and traffic congestion by removing pedestrians "from the streets and
reroute them into the structures themselves ... a three-mile climate-
controlled sheltered network of shopping malls, concourses and promenades
which extend through block after block of construction, ... " 15 There
can be no doubt that congestion was somewhat relieved, and that the
underground network provided Montrealers with a refuge from the
severity of a cold Canadian winter as they moved about the core of the
city. This organization, on the other hand, also offered developers
the opportunity of capturing the activities already centralized in the
core of a city (shopping, restaurants, street entertainment, and
theater) upon one site under one ownership. Pedestrian traffic could
then be directed in patterns most beneficial for the developer. Although
the intent was clear, leaving the surface streets barren of pedestrian
activity might be arguable,16 particularly when the alternative --
these underground promenades under larger-scaled ownership -- is a
more highly controlled situation in which marginal business might not
gain entry.
This new problem of growth also became the model for purposeful
transformation of larger areas of the city. Mayor Drapeau and his
administration attempted to put this new model of urban organization to
not only giving Montreal the appearance of new vitality, but to also
give the French Canadian some control and identity within this new
image. Hence the city's development of infrastructure amenable to such
a pattern was actively encouraged into the eastern side of the city's
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central area to identify this growth with French interests, and, in
some indirect way, to integrate the French presence into the circle
of powerful (and English) decision-makers: the corporations financial
institutions, and the legal and technical professions. The result was
the formation of the "nationalist" axis which, although still incomplete,
very much illustrated the continuing struggle in a dual city.
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16. The full effects of this possibility has not been felt in Montreal.
The reason for this seems to hinge upon the complementary nature of
the underground network, which runs from north to south, and the
surface pedestrian traffic on the main shopping street -- St.
Catherine -- which runs east to west. The two systems cross
one another close to Place Ville Marie. Ponte's intention was to
put as much underground as possible. This has never been fully
carried out in Montreal. Other cities, notably Toronto, have
demonstrated that where this underground option has been exercised,
the street traffic does indeed atrophy.
CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
This chapter summarizes the events of the case to assess the most
immediate factors that were contributing to the outcome. This assess-
ment is followed by a more general discussion of economic conditions
for the railway and their bearing on changing land values and uses.
Finally, Zeckendorf's own theory of action is offered in explanation
of the final outcome.
The Role of Visible Opportunity:
The most conspicuous quality of the Canadian National site during
this period of change was its visibility as an opportunity to various
actors. It had always been, for example, an opportunity for Canadian
National itself to supplement its revenues through air-rights develop-
ment. It increasingly became a more attractive (and necessary) opportunity
as economic circumstances changed. (The latter part of this chapter
will deal with this situation in more detail.) It was also a visible
opportunity for the Robert Simpson Company to solve its central city
parking problems and compete with the expanding suburban shopping centers.
There was, in addition, the ever-present opportunity for speculation as
conditions became more favorable for a profitable venture. These
conditions were present as land uses around the site changed from
predominantly residential to commercial and office.
This site itself had been the result of an opportunity made
possible by a "fuzzy" belt of uses between an established western
residential area, and the easterly downtown area. MacKenzie and Mann's
tunnel terminal and freight yards had been an exceptionally bold and
ingenious playing-out of this opportunity.
The nature of this more 'recent opportunity was not the fuzziness
of a location, but the strategic location of the site with respect
to changing uses -- changes that the presence of the railway
terminal itself helped to catalyze.
Development had been drifting westward since the wealthy and
powerful English Montreal merchants and businessmen built their
residences upon the hillside to the west. The density and high land
values of the St. James and Notre-dame Street areas encouraged the
larger department stores to locate away from this density and cost in
order to secure the larger areas of land they needed, and yet remain
accessible to their consumers. The choice was the avenues linking the
well-to-do residential areas with the work places of Vieux Montreal.
The location of these commercial uses -- first, the big department
stores of Henry Birk and Sons; T. Eaton, Robert Simpson, and Morgan
followed by the host of specialty shops, restaurants, entertainment
establishments, and theatres -- significantly raised land values along
their main location on St. Catherine Street.
The value of the railway lands alone does not explain the opportunity
for development nor does it explain the size of what was to finally
occupy that land. It would be more to the point to consider the
differential in values that this area contained. The railway land itself
varied between six and ten dollars per square foot. Adjacent parcels
fluctuated anywhere between ten and twenty dollars per square foot.
The commercial area on St. Catherine Street showed considerable locational
sensitivity with a value on one parcel of 6545 square feet of 413,350
dollars, or 62 dollars per square foot. This was considerably above the
almost homogeneous 40 dollars per square foot of the dense and established
area on St. James Street. If some notion of "maturity" were to be based
on this, it would be framed in terms of the stability and differential
of land values. St. James Street was relatively stable and even in
values while the site of Place Ville Marie and its surroundings were
young and volatile in terms of value. This would tangibly indicate
the locus of change.
The conclusion is that the intensity of building occupying the
rai'lway lands and adjacent locations is better appreciated as a
product meant to exploit a potential and anticipated value than as a
response to high values which only dense and lofty construction wou)d
make economically viable.
The Role of Land: Demand and Scarcity:
More support for the viewpoint outlined above is evident when we
consider the arguments of demand for accomodation and scarcity of land.
The real estate community generally recognized that Montreal was perhaps
able to absorb as much as 750,000 square feet of office space over a
five-year period. This was much below the 3.4 million square feet
Zeckendorf intended to build.
Zeckendorf, however, argued that he was to build accomodations
more suited to the needs of the new "great corporations." This simply
consisted of the need for "large areas of at least 20,000 square feet
on one floor in buildings with considerable prestige." Zeckendorf went
further with Place Ville Marie. He asked Henry N. Cobb for 35,000
square feet per floor. There is a contradiction in Place Ville Marie's
attempt to meet these "needs," however. The cruciform, which was the
result of Zeckendorf's wish to provide "identity for more than one major
-tenant," breaks these 35,000 square feet into separate blocks each in
the order of 7,000 square feet. The central area of the cruciform,
furthermore, is entirely consumed by core structure, elevator shafts,
mechanical, electrical, telephone spaces, washrooms and circulation space.
What remains to fulfill the needs of the "great corporations" is an
uninterrupted floor area much the same as many existing office structures
in the city. It might therefore be argued the need is for the
arrangement of those four quadrants on one floor. This is difficult
to assess. The large corporations certainly occupy more than one floor.
Alcan (Aluminum Limited) occupies even floors in Place Ville Marie;
as does the Royal Bank. One might reasonably ask if one building
consisting of single floor areas roughly equivalent to one arm of the
cruciform would be qualitatively different. This, however, would describe
the Canadian Imperial Bank building which was (and remains) one of
Place Ville Marie's competitors. Having the functional units of the
corporations on a single floor is doubtless preferred. But the crucial
issue remains the adjacencies between functional units of the corporate
organization. 2 Yet here we are dealing more with marginal distinctions
and not compelling differences.
The same is true for the argument that large floor spaces are
necessary. It is undoubtedly true that large floor spaces can facilitate
layouts of various corporate departments to more directly reflect their
organizational structure. It could also be argued that these spaces
would allow changes to be made with relatively less effort and expense.
(This, however, is very much dependent upon how those floors are built
upon by the tenant.) These factors, although they may in some circum-
stances be helpful, are not vital to the profitable operation of the
corporation. If this were the case, such huge corporations as Canadian
Pacific; occupying a railway station built between 1881 and 1919, would
have succumbed to.its sub-standard facilities and changed "needs"
some time ago. Yet here again we deal with an issue of marginal costs
and benefits. It seems absurd that a corporation would undertake the
expense of Cusually) much higher rents and costly tenant improvements
to achieve an arrangement of facilities that do not seem compelling
in terms of improved operation or savings in operating costs although
both of these might (or might not) result.
The argument of scarcity is also not entirely convincing. The
major locus of Montreal's growth was on the suburban fringe. The central
office functions downtown were growing slowly at best. For a very long
time, Montreal had been losing any intensive corporate growth to
Toronto, which traditionally had been better situated with respect to
industrial production sites in Canada and the U.S. Place Ville Marie
would seem to have stimulated a new demand, but the building did not
substantially turn this basic condition around. The difficulty of the
situation could be seen at the outset of this office building boom in
Montreal. All three developments were required to, at least, buy the
leases for the old quarters of their prospective tenants. Some bought
whole buildings (like Zeckendorf and Rudberg). Zeckendorf, furthermore,
admitted that return on the Place Ville Marie investment was not what
he would have expected:
While I would say the return is adequate, it is certainly not
consistent with the efforts and daring that went into the
Place Ville Marie, nor with the extraordinary expense that
was committed to create a building of this quality.
The assessments of growth, I would speculatewere based upon a response
measured in demand, not upon where demand was coming from. One development
analyst from Canadian Pacific found that Montreal's pattern of development
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was to shift office populations from one space to another.
'f Another example may be found in the fact that Zeckendorf never
intended the banks to move from St. James Street. He felt uneasy about
encouraging such a move in Montreal while carrying out his famous
"Wall Street Maneuver" in New York designed to prevent the banks from
moving uptown. Persuading the Royal Bank to become the prime tenant was
desperate plunge to realize the project. As we have seen, it was the
boldness of the proposal to Muir and the arguments affecting the bank's
image that swayed the outcome.
The Role of Prestige and Image:
The factor of prestige is much more illuminating in explaining this
change in Montreal. The role of corporate pride and the outward
expression of their economic importance and power probably define the
source of "demand" and "need" more clearly than any other factor.
This was especially true for the banks.
The realization and form of Place Ville Marie is imbued with this
concern for a symbolism of dominance over a city. The struggle between
the Royal Bank and the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, the snow-
balling of speculation in this form of building, atd the willingness of
corporations to shift are largely derived from this concern. The
relationship of Place Ville Marie to other important physical features
and social institutions in the city, its "center-of-the-city" symbolism,
and even the deeply historical connotations of its name all add to
exclusiveness and desirability. These are the ingredients of demand
creation: identity, prestige, and image. They also become so inextricably
bound up in the sense of utility of the structure that "use" becomes
an abstract and imprecise term when set apart from these other qualities.
Many of these factors -- particularly those that deal with physical
relationships and symbolism -- are important features in the urban
environment in other ways; for example, to the city's legibility or social
and historical continuity. These elements and the aims of corporate pride
and dominance may seem concident,but it is the latter that is, in fact,
setting the context in which the former will be played out. Coincidence,
furthermore, may not be the established order of the relationship
as the uproar over the occasional destruction of a prized landmark by
just these aims of corporate pride and dominance has often pointed out.
The Role of the Developer:
The significance of Zeckendorf's personal flair in the formative
phases of the project, and his rigorous pursuit of his original
conceptions of what ought to occur on the site cannot be underrated.
He very much considered himself a modern Medici, personally giving the
city significant monuments that were to be the best examples of the
architecture and urban design of the age. He considered himself a
patron to his architects; allowing them the fullest freedom to express
themselves as they wished. They, of course, considered him the perfect
client, only encumbering them with the most general of directives.
Zeckendorf prided himself on the circle of very young and energetic
people he gathered to work on his projects. "I gave these young men
all the work and responsibility they could handle, and more ... the
youth-quake we instituted in stodgy old Montreal was an exceptional one,"
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he wrote.of the team he had assembled to design and build Place Ville Marie.
Zeckendorf's reputation for showmanship and his tendency to incorporate
a gracious gesture or a ruthless snub into the physical form and content
of his projects gives credence to this personal image of power and
patronage. The image is misleading, however. Acting as a broker of
prestige, symbolism, and monumentalism obfurcates his more fundamental
role as a facilitator of processes and wealth much larger than himself.
* * * *
To summarize, then, we have observed the major contributor to the
building of Place Ville Marie to be the attempt to realize latent
value and create new value through a change in use. There is, further-
more, a significant factor in the overall organization and form of Place
Ville Marie reflecting power, image, prestige and dominance. This
second set of factors, in addition,reinforces the objectives of the
first while simultaneously fulfilling more general needs in the s'tructure
and perceptual experience of the city.
Land Values and Changes in Use:
The connection between the change in use and the heightened value
of land derived from this is of fundamental importance to this study.
It is upon this connection that Zeckendorf based his decision of what
Place Ville Marie would be, and the roles that other important features
of the city would play in achieving its ends. It is upon this connection
that the city measure-s its health (through tax assessment and revenues).
It is ultimately the demands of this connection that directed the shape
of the central city,generally.
Canadian National itself felt -the effects of this connection
and-acted to better their position; earlier initiating change from a
position of economic strength, and later reacting to forces outside
its immediate control. This distinction is worth co-nsidering more
closely for it illustrates some of the characteristics of this connection
between land value and use.
The railways were the most important individual forces shaping
the city of Montreal between 1860 and 1920. The Grand Trunk and the
Canadian Pacific had both originally responded to the existing fabric
of the city as they lay track alignments and determined the location of
their station facilities. Once these were built, they greatly influenced
the pattern of values and subsequent growth. This particular study
began with the description of the engineers maneuvering of a competing
railway company for a ldcation in that city. Its construction again
altered that pattern of values and growth, stimulating development
and enhancing values.
After the 1920's, however, the railways began losing ground as the
most important instruments of change. By the early 1930's, Royal
Commission hearings were convened by the Federal Government to investigate
the transportation situation in Canada -- particularly the losses of the
Canadian National system and the declining profits of Canadian Pacific.
Their findings criticized the competition between the railways with its
resulting wasteful duplication of facilities. There was also the
competition from rival modes of transportation, notably the truck
(and later the airplane). The railways' assets were critically evaluated.
Every item of expenditure on land, buildings, roadways, switching
equipment, and rolling stock were scrutinized to discover the sources
of waste and methods by which the rail transportation might again
be profitable.
Although the railway network remained important to industry and
agriculture, the companies no longer enjoyed an unchallenged position.
Highway construction made truck transport more viable than rail in
servicing some areas, particularly the newer suburban factory sites
that were becoming more and more commonplace. One result of this shift
was the enormous centrally located tracts of land that were no longer
completely utilized by the railway. Central city freight handling
was, by and large, much reduced, and passenger traffic was declining
wi.th the more widespread use of the automobile. The railways, in
addition, found themselves incurring heavy expenses to relocate tracks
to out-of-town production sites.
The central location of the railway passenger terminals had always
been an opportunity to realize a return from adjacent development.
Grand Central Station in New York is an example of a railway company
taking advantage of the activity and heightened land value their presence
generatedand the large areas of land available from the nature of
railway operation. The exploitation of the potential in this example
was essentially due to technical factors: the electrification of railway
locomotives and the development of structural methods to develop air-rights.
By the late 1940's, the situation in Montreal was much different.
The presence of railway tracks and activities no longer escalated land
values but were more likely to depress them. Office spaces and supporting
businesses became more dominant, and the expansion in their importance
placed pressure for change upon these underutilized railway lands.
One response of the railways to the new economic circumstances
was to diversify their operations. Canadian Pacific, for example,
had been in a relatively good position to embark on just such a course.
Like the other railways, they were involved with hotels and water-borne
transportation. They now expanded into the areas that threatened to
compete with them so that their markets could be assured. They developed
a trucking subsidiary, an airline, a telecommunications branch, an
industrial shipping fleet, an investment group, and a real estate
development group that emerged from the old railway department overseeing
rights-of-way. A holding company was formed to direct the "profit
centers" of this emerging empire. The strategy was successful. Canadian
Pacific's profits in 1977 exceeded 200 million dollars.
The real estate operation is to be noted. Canadian Pacific,
through Marathon Realty Cas this operation is called), embarked on
development projects designed to utilize the vast tracts of land they
owned but no longer required for rail operations.
Canadian National faced a similar economic situation, and
it too expanded into trucking, telecommunications, and airline trans-
portation. But its field of operations was always dictated by Act of
Parliament and (as Thornton forcefully articulated in the early 30's),
the political "winds" that might be blowing in Ottawa during the life of
any administration. As a result, it was less flexible in transforming
its structure to suit new conditions.
Nevertheless, the excess land holdings provided an opportunity
for much needed revenue. Donald Gordon's concern for the "hole" in
downtown Montreal was rooted in circumstances of his own time as
much as the images of expansion of Henry Thornton or William MacKenzie
were rooted in theirs. Development was a good and necessary idea for
the continued profitability of the corporation. The question was how.
Zeckendorf offered the opportunity to pursue that revenue potential
without the tedious task of outlining intentions to form a real estate office
and procuring the required change in the Railway Act in Parliament.
Zeckendorf's Theory of Action:
The economic pressures and opportunities latent in the geographic
position of this piece of land to other uses both proximate and more
distant (St. James Street) set the stage for change. That development
would occur is unquestionable. But as we have seen from the situation
of demand and land value, the form development would take was much less
certain. It is clear from the context that a fragmented development
closer in form to the original projects first envisioned by Henry Thornton
was far more likely. The architect's first instinct with the Place
Ville Marie project was toward this piece-by-piece development which
might more closely reflect a rate-of market absorption, and a stimulation
and growth in demand. This was also the instinct of Zeckendorf's aides.
This was not Zeckendorf's instinct, however. His instructions to the
architect were clear: one building of at least 35,000 square feet
per floor with identity for more than one "major tenant." He also
intended that everything be built at one time for fear that some parts
of the project might go unrealized. Zeckendorf's own theory of land
development might illuminate his rather adamant pursuit of the project
in the form he envisioned.
Zeckendorf's reshaping of central cities could only be achieved
by what he refered-to as "a change in its human chemistry." "The
best way to achieve this result," he wrote, "is through new and better
land uses." 6 This was accomplished through the creation of "increment;"
that is, the leverage of land values upward through a strategic change in
use. Achieving this might involve many things, but Zeckendorf maintains
that to "design and rebuild our communities, we must do it on a broad,
117bold scale ... We must have big, brilliant planning
He illustrated this principle of value increment through his
United Nations project in New York. "It is one of those cases of one
and one being worth three," he pointed out. 8 There was the problem
of area for example. A consolidated large site was more "valuable"
than individual ones "because it has more functional use." There was
also value created by having important features adjoining a site. In
the UN project, Webb and Knapp created a 320-feet-wide mall because
"anything that fronted the beautiful, monumental approach had to be
more valuable than anything on a conventional 60-foot-wide street." 9
To prove his point, he noted that "the difference between land on Fifth
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Avenue ... and the value of land just east of it on the side streets
is the difference between $20 a foot and $100 a foot." Another generator
of value, he continued,is a strong relationship to some "composite whole"
and not "a heterogeneous mass of fluid junk ...
"Big, bold planning" over large areas of land was the important
generator of value, and this condition was not always possible in large
cities with relatively fine-grain patterns of ownership. Zeckendorf
therefore strongly supported the "condemnation" powers of city govern-
ments, the large scale zoning activities of their planning departments,
and the city programs of providing amenities and infrastructure to aid
in the process of redevelopment. But this particularly'must be done,
he argues, so that increment can be created.
"If the city ... decides it is going to build a park, it
should condemn an area around the park and should realize on
the increased value of the land aro nd the park through
the resale to private developers."
He particularly underlined the virtues of land assembly. The city should
pursue this course because value was created "from the greater functional
utility of larger areas." 12
The "greater functional utility" to which he refers, of course,
consists of those uses most likely to generate revenue: office space
as a secure and long-term income stream, and retail and commercial
space as a high revenue producing adjunct.
* * * *
The major theme that has emerged has been the process of change
and its relation to value. The conclusion about the source of that
change is the power and influence of economic factors. Place Ville Marie
is one building. Its construction stimulated the building of three
separate and neighboring projects. The financing arrangements generated
many effects including buildings as far away as British Columbia
intended as sources of capital for Place Ville Marie's sinking fund.
The flow of capital for the project reached far beyond local interests
and national boundaries to the few who control world-wide financial
and production empires. There were benefits, and some less positive
tendencies (particularly in subsequent development). This was a
spontaneous and private sector change. There was first a pronounced
lack of any public policy to deal with the situation;.followed by
public policy intended to expand the model of Place Ville Marie throughout
the central business district. There was also a long standing ethnic,
linguistic, and class distinction influencing the form and application
of that policy. Most conspicuously of all, this change in Montreal has been the
reorganization of a city around the profitable expansion of investment
capital.
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The sort of development Zeckendorf pursued was increasingly resisted
in the United States as a result of the "condemnation" rights of
cities being directed at neighborhood after neighborhood. Grass-roots
resistence mounted, and an ethic of conservation and revitalization
emerged. In the fall of 1972, he came to Montreal to speak at McGill
University on the invitation of the school of Architecture. At dinner
with a number of students and a well-known architect by the name of
Fred Lebensold, Zeckendorf intimated his intention to announce that
night McGill University and the University of Montreal should jointly
take up residence on the islands of the Montreal exposition of 1967.
That way, huge tracts of land would be freed for redevelopment on
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both sides of the mountain. The students were silently unbelieving,
and Lebensold chuckled.
"Oh come now Bill, surely you can't be serious," he said.
Zeckendorf dropped the subject immediately. He also forgot the
subject at his lecture; speaking instead of the great service the
architectural profession might pay to urban history by taking heed
of Buckminster Fuller's accomplishments and theories, and build an
enclosing dome over the entire city. He encouraged the audience to
think of the possibilities of entirely climate controlled environments.
For those of us who attended that dinner, there was a sense of
a man who was living in the glories of his past. His theory was
still valid, but his style was not.
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APPENDIX A:
THE GENERALIZATION TO THEORY: NOTES ON CONTENT AND PROBLEMS
My original intention was to develop some notion of how the conclu-
sions of the case study contribute to a general theory of urban form.
Aside from articulating the objective of a theory, the pursuit revealed
numerous problems (some of which I include here) that will be the object
of further work.
The Content of Theory:
A theoretical framework should incorporate (or allow the incorporation)
of nuances and contradictions that reflect the complexity of the contexts
of activity and process of realization. Here in change of the type I
have documented, some of this complexity is evidenced in the form and loca-
tion of a building. There is, however, a great deal more that is less
readily discernible: the processes of design; their intentions; the
assembly of capital; the secondary impacts of financing; and the social
relations of people and institutions that ultimately inhabit a project.
Indeed the focus of study could be expanded to encompass a description
and analysis of social systems. There is, from this point of view, validity
to the assertion that the form and content of a building "contain" the
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structure of a city and a society as much as the city contains the building.
This broader and dialectical formulation, one hopes, looks beyond surface
occurances to what more fundamentally shapes the outcomes we observe.
There is an extensive array of theories attempting to understand
the fundamental forces shaping the city. Although a thorough review of
these theories and an evaluation of their merits and deficiencies is beyond
this summary, there are one or two that have particular bearing upon
the factors we observed to be important to this case.
The economic theories of city formation, for example, deal with
the effects of money transactions, production costs, transportation costs,
and agglomeration economies and diseconomies on the form of the city.
More generally, they isolate these important economic components
concentrating upon a "total spatial array of economic activities with
attention payed to geographic variations in prices and costs."1 These
may involve industrial concentration, or merchantile activities, for
example. The final patterns are the result of equilibria in the system
as a whole. Any changes that occur are viewed to take place through the
shifting of the equilibrium to a new and optional point.
These theories are descriptive and explanatory. Yet their descrip-
tions are themselves misleading. The basic paradigm of equilibrium is
arguable, and the permit of an analysis based upon this viewpoint necessarily
involves assumptions about human behavior and interaction (the "economic
man ," for example). The analyses are also a-historical,static formulations--
a result of the equilibrium that is assumed. These assumptions are at
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least inaccurate and at most wholly erroneous.
The most elegantly formulated of these economic theories is that
dealing with the specific pattern of rents in an urban location. It
argues that the pattern is the logical result of competitive bidding for a
scarce resource (urban land parcels). It has been useful in explaining
some of what we observe, yet it too is based upon the kinds of assump-
tions mentioned above. The theory is purely explanatory, but it has been
used to inform policy decision with respect to land-use and zoning. It
is clear that much of the complexity of the situation is assumed away,
and we have seen from the case that subtle complexities very much
condition the outcome. The ever-present danger is the misdirection of longer
range efforts, or the playing down of political or social factors that
might just turn out to be more important to the outcome than what the
parameters of these theories consider important.
We therefore ask an alternative general formulation to do a great
deal indeed; to explain the actions of different actors with different
interests in different situations. It must also be capable of accepting
more fundamental changes in social structure or behavior through time.
What might have been true yesterday might be in doubt today, and untrue
tomorrow Although this more general statement itself will be normative,
it must be able to account for shifts in values -- continuing to explain
and inform. Its basis must be clear and fundamental, unravelling
purposes and paths, and their relationships to outcomes.
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The central theme of the case was the relationship of a change in
u.se to the accentuation of land values upon which a developer makes
money. The intention of the generalization was to explore this
relationship. The tools for this exploration was the concept of use-
value and exchange-value, their relationship to one another, and
ultimately the mode of production which exerts pressure upon social
relations in a market economy to realize exchange-value above other more
utility-rooted concerns. Admittedly, there is a good deal that needs
definition here. The intention of an alternative theory, however,
proceeds from the realization that earlier theories of urban form and
formation (particularly those outlined above) assume the economic system
to be a means through which outcomes are achieved in a rational and
connected series of priorities, costs and benefits. This search begins
by acknowledging the economy to be an end in itself to which a great
deal becomes subservient.
The focus for this critique lies in the nature of exchange-value.
Yet that focus cannot assume a deterministic intent -- that all occurances*
can be explained through the pursuit of exchange-value. There is clearly
an extremely complex process occuring evidenced, for example, in the change
that occured in Montreal. Exchange-values are imbedded in the uses of
a place, its image in peoples' minds, and in its physical and social
qualities. The Marxian concept of use-value has proven to be a slippery
one in differentiating the socially based "needs" from the influence
of exchange-value. The dialectical relationship of these two aspects of
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value is an important link, but how that dialectic works is difficult
to articulate with clarity.
The next link is the influence of use-values and exchange-values
on land. Land is a commodity in a capitalist society, and is
therefore subject to the social relations of the market. Again, the
differentiation is its functional utility (some notion of socially
based "need") from its exchange-value as a commodity. Presumably,
this distinction also sets apart the pursuit of exchange-value as a
motive, and sets the stage for the argument that the changes in central
cities in recent urban history can be coherently linked to the
investment needs of a monopoly capitalist economy. It is clear, for
example, that the reorganization of Montreal brought about by Zeckendorf's
effort was one that mirrored the profitable expansion of investment
capital. It is also clear that a similar reorganization was evident
in every major city in North America.
The argument concerning the monopoly structure of the economy
and its link to the motive of realizing exchange-value proceeds from
the tendency of this structure to control (and generate) surplus.
Monopoly also allows this surplus to be directed toward investment in
various ways. Baron and Sweezy identify two types of investment:
endogenous and exogenous. Endogenous investment is that which is necessary
through, for example, increases in demand or replacement of worn
plant and equipment. Exogenous investment is a portion of surplus
actively seeking outlet and expansion independently of these factors.
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The increasing quantityof this surplus leads to increasing pressure for
expansion in the economic area into which it flows. Real estate figures
prominently in this flow. The argument is made, therefore, that the
primary motive of exchange-value is reflected in the contemporary form
of cities -- a result of this pressure of investment seeking surplus.
The argument returns to a concept of "class monopoly rent," the realization
of exchange-value for landed property, which is again linked to the
use-value/exchange-value relationship. 2
This relationship is elusive. Marx argues that the labor expended
in making physical substances a use-value to society, making clay into
a pot for example, constitutes its value. (Note it follows that use-
values exist without containing value in this sense -- air, trees, virgin
pasture, etc.) A commodity, then, is a use-value created by the one
unit in society for the purposes of realizing exchange-value
for another. The objective basis of that exchange, Marx points out,
is the value -- the quantity of "socially necessary labor" expended.
The critique is that through the social relations of this process,
the motives of production has shifted from a previously utilitarian
focus.
The value of the Marxian perspective is its relational power.
It is not fixed, but dynamic. This is a necessary condition of any
theory dealing with the relative and complex nature of urban activity
and change. The particular concepts may be problemmatic. The use-value/
exchange-value relationship, for example, is abstract, and I think
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somewhat reductionist. The labor theory of value becomes a focus of
exploration toward extracting concrete features (or serving to develop
them) that can be used to explain the use-value/exchange-value
relationship in land, and therefore in space. It is from here that
my study will continue ...
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